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Abstract: 
In this paper we want to do a comparative impact evaluation among the 
participants of two separate types of microfinance system; a microfinance system 
operated through individual liability microcredit contract represented by VSSU 
and a microfinance system under SGSY scheme of the Government of India 
which is operated through joint liability microcredit contract through forming 
Self-Help Group among the rural people mainly married women. This impact 
evaluation is done through Natural experiment whose time span is two years. It 
was observed that in the base line period the participants of VSSU are 
comparatively in better economic position than the participants of SGSY scheme 
and non participants who are treated as control group in our experiment. It is  
established that increment of monthly income among the member households of 
VSSU is more than the member households under SGSY scheme but when we 
consider the outcome variable as increment of monthly per capita consumption 
expenditure we see the reverse picture. There is no significant difference on 
expenditure for human development purposes is observed among the 
participants of two different types of microfinance system and even at the end 
line period both the member households still consider expenditure for health and 
education is luxury. When we consider intra household decision making power 
through constructing Women’s Empowerment Index as an outcome variable 
then the change is maximum among the female SHG members under SGSY 
scheme. We have also estimated the optimum size of micro credit which is 
helpful for all types of rural participants to improve their economic conditions 
within a short span of time.  
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JOINT VERSUS INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY IN MICROFINANCE – 
A COMPARATIVE IMPACT EVALUATION THROUGH 
NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
Introduction: 
Microfinance is emerging as a popular instrument towards the main objective of financial 
inclusion to the growing share of poor households who have not yet reached directly to 
the bank. Microfinance programme is operated either under joint-liability or under 
individual-liability credit contract. The group-lending method is based on joint liability 
credit contract when the borrowers linked by joint liability have to help through repaying 
the debt of any one of the group (s)he belongs who fails to repay. Actually under group 
lending microfinance scheme, loans are sanctioned individually to the group members but 
all in the group will have to face consequences if the borrower member runs in to serious 
repayment difficulties. Hence non-borrower co-members of the group will have to 
constantly monitor the borrower group-members which can be done most efficiently and 
at very minimum effort. Under joint liability micro-credit contract the loan size is limited 
by what the group can jointly guarantee. Sometimes heterogeneity in loan size can result 
in tension within the group as clients with smaller loans are reluctant to serve as a 
guarantor for those with larger loans. So clients dislike the tension caused by group 
liability. Excessive tension among the members is also responsible for voluntary dropout. 
So clients with growing business and those well ahead of their co-members in the 
economic activity may find that the group contract bogs everyone down. In recent years 
some micro lenders such as the Association for Social Advancement in Bangladesh or the 
Bank of Rakyat Indonesia, have expanded rapidly using individual liability loan contract. 
In case of individual liability, each borrower is only responsible for her own loan. Here 
loan should be dearer, because the lender has to bear good amount on monitoring and that 
type of loan recovery is much more uncertain. But we cannot ignore microcredit under 
individual liability, which looks no less successful particularly after observing the 
performance of Bank of Rakyat in Indonesia. The basic objective of this paper is to do 
comparative impact evaluation among the participants between these two types of 
microfinance system with the help of a Natural experiment. Here Vivekananda Seva 
Kendra-O-Sishu Uddyan (VSSU) represents the microfinance organization offering 
microcredit to its clients on the basis of individual liability loan contract and Self-Help 
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Group under SGSY scheme under government of India represents the microfinance 
programme under joint liability microcredit contract. In this paper in Section-II , we want 
to give a brief overview of existing literatures, in Section-III we shall discuss about the 
operating procedure of VSSU and Self-Help Group (SHG) under SGSY scheme, in 
Section-IV we shall mention the research questions and will also narrate about the 
sampling procedure and in Section V, we shall discuss about the results of our natural 
experiment.   
 Section-II: Overviews of Some Existing Literatures: 
The success of microcredit programme has captured the interest of many researchers in 
broad areas. One group of studies (Hashemi, Schular and Railey, 1996 Puhazhendi and 
Badatya, 2002) mentioned that microfinance scheme is very beneficial from socio-
economic point of view on the rural participants when Gotez and Sengupta (1996), Amin, 
Rai and Topa (2003) were not so much optimistic about the pogramme. Hulme and 
Mosley (1996) had shown that the microfinance does not assist the ultra-poor. Ghatak 
(1999) had shown that a safe borrower always choose identical borrowers at the time of 
group formation. All the above mentioned literatures are based on joint liability 
microcredit contract. 
Repayment is the only outcome of interest to the lender because of its ability to retain 
good borrowers. With this attract new ones is also equally important to access the overall 
profitability. Madajewicz (2008) established in her theoretical model that group liability 
loan is only desirable for the poor borrowers. In her model, below a certain level of 
wealth, group liability dominates individual liability. But above a certain wealth, 
individual liability will be preferred by rural households. Moreover she find that business 
funded with individual loans grow more than those funded with group loans. Lehner 
(2008) theoretically established that microfinance institutions offer group loans when size 
of credit is quite large. With a rather small loan size, all microfinance institutions offer 
individual loans. Empirical research on group versus individual liability borrowing has 
not provided policymakers and institutions the clear evidence needed to determine the 
relative merits of the two methodologies. The empirical literature instead has focused on 
related questions: which group characteristics lead to higher repayment (Ahiu, Townsend 
2007). Lenders who use individual liability loans look no different than same under joint 
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liability when judged by repayment rates. The better lender both joint liabilities as well as 
individual liability in enjoying repayment rates as high as 95%. The repayment rate in 
each and every financial year of Bangladesh Grameen Bank and Bank of Rakyat 
establishes the fact. Gine and Karlan (2006) conducted a field experiment in Phillipines. 
They found that by offering individual loans, a microfinance institution can attract 
relatively more clients. Yet both types of lending schemes do not differ in repayment 
rates. Mitra and Kundu (2009) have shown that rural households with larger size of land 
are more prone to take direct membership of Primary Agricultural Credit Society so that 
when required they can easily take microcredit from the society under individual liability 
credit contract. But marginal farmers or landless households are more prone to take 
membership of Self-Help group operated by Primary Agricultural Credit Society to take 
credit when required under joint liability loan contract. Kundu (2010) again proved that 
wealthier among the not so affluent rural households prefers to join microfinance system 
operating on the basis of individual liability loan contract, comparatively less wealthy 
prefers to join microfinance system operating on the basis of joint liability loan contract 
and ultra poor is less likely to any type of microfinance system.  But the comparative 
impact evaluation among the participants of group versus individual liability microcredit 
contract remains unanswered because almost all micro credit lenders offer only one type 
of contract either through joint liability or through individual liability and in a particular 
locality only one type of microcredit system is generally observable and most of the times 
that is under joint liability. But borrowers should have a choice of joining microfinance 
institution offering credit contract between individual liability and joint liability. If that is 
available, then only taking the participants of both types of system simultaneously we can 
make comparative impact evaluation of two types of micro-finance system on its 
participants. That can be done through „Natural experiment‟. Before proceeding to the 
above mentioned study, we initially have to develop few basic ideas about the operating 
procedure of two different types of microfinance systems considered here.  
Section-III: Operating Procedure of VSSU and Self-Help Group under SGSY 
Scheme:    
 Vivekananda Sevakendra–O-Sishu Uddyan (VSSU) is a microfinance institution 
operates the microfinance programme on the basis of individual lending in nine blocks of 
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South 24 Parganas district of West Bengal, India without taking any financial assistance 
from the government. The covered blocks are Kulpi, Mandir Bazar, Pathar Pratima, 
Kakdeep, Sagar, Diamond Harbour, Mathurapur -1 and 2 and Raichak. Total number of 
members under VSSU in 2006-07 had crossed 45000. It is involved in the provision of 
small scale savings and loan to rural individuals and business enterprises. VSSU collects 
savings of its clients from their doorsteps through his employees called „motivators‟. The 
savings can be daily savings, weekly savings or monthly savings. In daily savings 
scheme, each client can save at least Rs.10 daily. The rate of interest against savings 
deposit is 4% per annum. After accumulation of certain amount of savings regularly that 
individual can get credit from the micro-finance institution at least six months after 
becoming member of VSSU. The repayment period is generally one to three years 
depending on the size of loan. The loan has to be repaid in installments where monthly 
interest rate varies between 2% to 2.5% provided the size of borrowing is more than the 
amount of his savings deposits in the financial institution. But if the size of borrowing is 
less than the amount of his savings deposit, then the interest rate charged by the financial 
institution is 1.5% per month. As reported, most of the borrowers from VSSU borrow 
more than their savings deposit provided he has good amount of assets with high 
collateral value and he can present a guarantor during the time of application for loan. So 
the borrower is monitored not only by the motivators of VSSU but also by the guarantor. 
At the time of sanctioning individual loan by VSSU no specific preference is given to the 
female members of the households.  
In those same blocks we also observe the existence of government supported 
microfinance programme under Swarnajayanti Grameen Swarojgari Yojana (SGSY) 
scheme operated by the Central government with the help of local panchayet and District 
Rural Development Centre (DRDC). This programme is motivated by the concept of 
joint liability micro credit contract. Here each group consists of not more than 15 
members. The members are almost homogeneous in nature from the socio-economic 
point of view. It is operating like ROSCA (Besley, Coat, Loury, 1993). Self Help Group 
is formed mainly on the basis of self-selection mechanism. They initially have to 
contribute a minimum amount in their respective groups regularly and on monthly (and 
sometimes on weekly) basis. The total collected amount is deposited in to nearby 
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commercial bank. Each group has a group leader and a treasurer who are selected 
democratically by the group members. After accumulation of certain amount of group 
corpus, a member can take credit from the group she belongs. At the time of demanding 
loan she has to explain clearly in which purpose loan is required in front of other co-
members of the group. If her explanation satisfies other group members, then only loan is 
granted where written consent of all the members is necessary. The credit has to be repaid 
within stipulated time period. Most of the times, the rate of interest is 2% per month
i
. 
After six months of group formation, the commercial bank, DRDC officials and a 
representative of the panchayat will examine the performance of the group. If it is 
satisfactory, then that group will be qualified as Grade-1. After that, the group can get 
refundable financial help from DRDC and cash credit from the attached commercial 
bank. The group has to repay the cash credit with interest but the contribution of DRDC 
is an interest free loan. Sum total of the two above mentioned fund is called revolving 
fund, which totally depends on accumulated group corpus prior to gradation test. So 
micro-credit under SGSY scheme is based on „Progressive lending’ which enables the 
lender to „test‟ borrowers with small loans at the initial stage in order to screen out the 
worst prospects before expanding the loan scale. The revolving fund makes the financial 
condition of the group healthy and the group can then disburse larger amount of credit to 
it members so that more members can now invest the credit in different income 
generating activities. It is expected that higher investment means higher return and that 
can help the borrower to improve the livelihood of his (her) family.  
SECTION IV: Research Questions and Sample Designs: 
 
1. We shall try to do a comparative impact assessment through Natural Experiment about 
the effectiveness of those two separate types of microfinance system to uplift different 
socio-economic indicators of the rural microfinance participants. Here the chosen 
outcome variables are changes of monthly income, changes of monthly per-capita adult 
equivalent consumption expenditure and changes of expenditure on education and health.  
2. We shall also want to make a comparative study about the role of two different types of 
micro-finance system for enhancement of women‟s empowerment (intra-household 
decision making power) after constructing Women‟s Empowerment Index (The method 
of calculating the index is described in the Appendix).          
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We initially have chosen three-gram panchayets Gabberia, Ghateswar, Krishnapur of 
Mandirbazar Block of South 24 Parganas district of West Bengal, India where we 
observe simultaneous existence of both types of microfinance systems. South 24 
Parganas district itself is an economically backward district and the sample gram 
panchayets are also economically backward. The sample villages are Gabberia, Tajpur, 
Raghunathpur, Raipur and Bhagirathpur of Gabberia gram panchayet, Ghateswar, 
Polerhat, Bijoygaunj, and Baidyapara of Ghateswar Gram panchayet and Krishnapur and 
Madhabpur of Krishnapur Gram panchayet.  The block, gram panchayets and villages 
under the sample gram panchayets were chosen randomly. In our sample villages the 
rural household has a choice and he (she) can either join VSSU or form SHG under 
SGSY scheme. The household even fails to participate in any above-mentioned type of 
microfinance programme. Here it has to be mentioned that from each household only one 
member can participate in any of the two microfinance programme.  
The technique of „Natural experiment‟ is applied to study the impact of any economic 
programme mainly taken by the government. It is expected that a developmental 
programme may change some economic indicators of a particular group of people where 
it is implemented. The basic objective of „Natural Experiment‟ is to compare the reaction 
of group affected by the change of those of another group having similar characteristics 
but is untouched by the change. The first group is called „Treatment group‟ and the 
second group is called the „Control group‟. To do the experiment we have to depend on 
„panel data of two periods for „before versus after comparison‟. The basic objective to 
use the two period data is that the presence of common effect from both observable and 
unobservable factors can be removed through modeling the differences between the 
outcomes of the two period primary data. Initially we have to draw samples of the rural 
households of those sample villages from its voter list randomly. After that each 
representative of the sample household is asked whether he (she) a member of VSSU or 
Self-Help Group (SHG) under SGSY scheme or not. If the household belongs to any 
microfinance system then he (she) is asked whether he (she) has joined in any of the 
above microfinance institution around August to October 2006 (which is here represented 
as t
th
 time period as well as the base line period of our experiment)
ii
. If the household has 
joined in any microfinance system during that specific time period then he (she) was 
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asked his details socio-economic conditions during the time of joining the programme 
considering previous one month as reference period. As in this experiment we consider 
the time gap of two years we have to ask the same households with same set of questions 
about their socio-economic conditions between August-October 2008 (which is here 
considered as (t+1)
th
 period or the end line period of our experiment). The time gap of 
two years is considered in order to minimize the recall period and to use direct 
observations as much as possible.  
Now the total sample is divided in to three following groups.    
1. The sample respondents joined in VSSU in the tth period.  
2.  The sample respondents who have formed SHG under SGSY scheme of the government   
  in the t
th
 period. 
3. A non-participants household in any type of microfinance programme belongs to almost 
same socio-economic background and have failed to join in any type of microfinance 
system between the base line and end line period but have the eligibility criterion for 
joining any type of microfinance system.  
The first two categories of samples belong to the treatment group while the last category 
of samples belongs to the reference group. During the time of considering the treatment 
group, we have to consider sample households belong to both types of group separately. 
Total sample size of the treatment group is 244. Out of which 121 belongs to first 
treatment group, 123 belongs to second treatment group (drawn randomly from 22 Self-
Help Groups under SGSY scheme where 18 are totally women groups and 4 are male 
groups). Total sample size of control group is 90. During the time of drawing samples of 
the treatment group we ignore the households who are involved in both types of 
microfinance programme though total number of such households in those three gram 
panchayets is very few. If that happens, then there is a possibility that the borrowers will 
become over indebted and they may have the intension through paying one lender‟s 
installment by taking a loan from another.  
 SECTION V: The Results of our Natural Experiments: 
In order to evaluate the impact of a certain policy, we have to compare the outcomes 
between what has happened to individuals‟ participation in the programme and what 
would have happened to them without it. As the outcome of what would have happened 
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to the same individual without programme is not observable it would be not possible to 
observe the same person in different states at the same time. In other words it would not 
be possible to observe the outcomes regarding what would have happened without the 
programme for those who are not in the programme. Thus for a programme participant, 
we can only observe the outcome variable with the programme and for a nonparticipant 
outcome without the programme. Identifying a control group is critical since there are 
chances of selection bias in such type of evaluation study. Selection bias here is mitigated 
by using Longitudinal data for „before versus after’ comparison and using „Difference in 
Difference‟ (Double Difference) method over time. The data requirement for this design 
is observations during t
th
 period and (t+1)
th 
period. We consider the value of outcome at 
constant price of both the treatment group and control group in both the time periods 
considering t
th
 period as base year. Several outcome variables are considered in the study. 
It is divided in to three parts: a) basic household welfare measures such as average 
monthly income (MINCOME) and monthly adult equivalent per-capita consumption 
expenditure (MPCE), b) expenditure on human capital investment such as expenditure on 
child‟s education and health and c) enhancement of women‟s empowerment or 
enhancement of intra- household decision making power of the participating woman or 
the wife of the participants. All the outcome variables are assumed to be continuous in 
nature. During the time of calculating MPCE of the sample households both in the t
th
 and 
(t+1)
th
 period we following NSSO technique considered mixed reference period. Here we 
considered the information on consumption expenditure based on 30 day uniform recall 
period for all items and also by 365-day recall period for four less frequently consumed 
items like institutional medical care, durables, clothing and foot wear.  
Table – 1 and Table-2 shows the distribution of the all the sample households in terms of 
monthly income and monthly per-capita consumption expenditure both at  t
th
  and (t+1)
th
 
period.  
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Table-1: Distribution of the sample households in terms of Average Monthly Income 
(Constant Price) 
 VSSU SGSY NON-MEMBER 
Income 
(Rs) 
t
th
 period  (t+1)
th
 
period 
t
th
 period (t+1)
th
 
period 
t
th
 period (t+1)
th
 
period 
< 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 
500-1000 1 0 1 1 4 4 
1001-2500 12 6 66 49 62 57 
2501-5000 66 57 44 56 17 22 
5001-7500 23 32 09 13 4 4 
7501-
10000 
19 24 03 4 3 3 
Total 121 121 123 123 90 90 
Source: Calculated from the data collected from field survey. 
Actually 118 VSSU members, 119 Self Help Group members under SGSY scheme and 
86 non-members could improve monthly income in constant term in the (t+1)
th
 period if 
we compare that with t
th
 period after considering t
th
 period as base period.   
Table-2 : Distribution of the sample households in terms of MPCE (Constant Price) 
 VSSU SGSY NON-MEMBER 
MPCE 
(Rs.) 
t
th
 period (t+1)
th
 
period 
t
th
 period (t+1)
th
 
period 
t
th
 period (t+1)
th
 
period 
<417 1 1 22 07 26 22 
418-500 2 2 17 14 18 16 
501-600 13 7 19 25 16 18 
601-700 5 10 26 23 15 13 
701-800 18 16 20 22 10 15 
801-900 15 13 05 11 2 3 
901-1000 13 18 03 6 2 2 
>1000 54 54 11 15 1 1 
Total 121 121 123 123 90 90 
Source: Calculated from the data collected from field survey 
Official rural poverty line of each state for 1999-2000 was updated for each state using 
CPIAL (Consumer‟s Price Index of Agricultural Labourers) of that particular state. In 
2004-05 that updated rural poverty line of West Bengal was Rs.382.82 (Himanshu, 2007) 
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and in August, 2006 that became Rs.417
iii
. Table-5 shows that only 1 VSSU member was 
below poverty line in the base-line period and he could not cross that poverty line even in 
the (t+1)
th
 period. But 22 SHG member households were below the official poverty line 
in the t
th
 period but in the (t+1)
th
 period, only 7 member households were still lying below 
the poverty line. So 15 SHG member households could cross the poverty line through 
SGSY scheme between the experimental time periods. But the performance of the 
households belong to control group are not satisfactory. 26 sample households belong to 
control group were lying below the poverty line in the t
th
 period and in the (t+1)
th
 period 
22 sample households were remain below the poverty line. Actually 96 VSSU members, 
116 SHG members and 78 non-members could improve their adult equivalent monthly 
per-capita consumption expenditure between the base line period and end line period.  
Now during the time of implementing Double-Difference Method in our Experiment, we 
shall have to follow the following procedures: The notations used in the technique of 
Double – Difference Method is explained in the following tabular form (Table-3):    
Table-3 : The „method of  calculation of Double-Difference Method  
Group Base Year Current Year First 
Difference 
Second 
Difference 
Treatment 
Group  
 
,  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Control Group  
 
 
 
  
 
    
Here     and  explain average monthly income of all the 
sample respondents belong to each treatment group at t
th
 period and at (t +1 )
th
 period 
respectively. Similarly  and   explains average monthly 
income of all the sample respondents belong to control group at t
th
 period and at (t+1)
th
 
period respectively. Again    and  explain average monthly adult 
equivalent per capita consumption expenditure of all the sample households belong to 
each treatment group at t
th
 period and at (t+1)
th
 period respectively. Similarly 
and     explains average monthly adult equivalent per capita 
consumption expenditure of all the sample households belong to control group at t
th
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period and at (t+1)
th
 period respectively.  and  indicate mean 
difference of monthly income between the t
th
 period and (t+1)
th
 period of all the sample 
households belong to treatment group and control group respectively. Similarly   
and    indicate mean difference of monthly per capita consumption expenditure 
between t
th
 period and (t+1)
th
 period of the sample households belong to treatment group 
and control group respectively. Now we have to test the following hypothesizes: 
H0:   
H1:   or  >  
  Initially we have to establish whether there exists any significant difference between the 
mean income or mean per-capita consumption expenditure of the sample households of 
the prospective VSSU members and non-members or prospective SHG members under 
SGSY scheme and non-members in the base line period. It is obvious 
that ,  and   all are independently 
distributed and same thing also happens for MPCEt among the two types of participants 
and non-participants. Statistical test establishes the fact that 
 as well as  and both are 
significant at 1% level where the value of test-statistic are 6.94 and 6.50 respectively. 
Statistical test also establishes the fact that difference between  
  or  and   is 
insignificant at 1% level where the value of test statistic are .64 and .92 respectively. So 
in the base line period, the average monthly income or average monthly per-capita 
consumption expenditure of the entire sample households belong to VSSU were higher 
than that of all the sample households belong to control group. But there was no 
significant difference is observed among the participants of SGSY scheme and non-
members in the base-line period. 
After applying Difference-in Difference (Double Difference) method it is established that 
  and   >  and 
that is significant at 1% level. So significant enhancement of monthly income and 
monthly per-capita consumption expenditure is observed between the t
th
 period and 
(t+1)
th
 period among the participants of VSSU if we compare that with the non-
participants. With this it is also established that 
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  and  >  and the 
first one is significant at 1% level and the second one is significant at 5% level. So it is 
also established that microfinance participation have made some differences in change of 
monthly income and monthly per capita consumption expenditure of the sample 
households under SGSY scheme between the t
th
 period and (t+1)
th
 period if we compare 
that with the non-participants.  
Now the question is whether microcredit plays any significant role among the 
microfinance participants to improve its monthly income and MPCE. Our data collected 
from field survey shows out of 121 sample households who had joined VSSU in the t
th
  
period, 58 have taken credit within the experimental time period. The maximum and 
minimum size of credit was Rs.50000 and Rs.500 respectively and the average size of 
that was Rs.4492.56. Similarly out of 123 sample households of SHG members, 87 took 
credit from respective group within the concerned two years. Here the maximum, 
minimum and average sizes of credit are Rs.6500, Rs.400 and Rs.1585.31 respectively. 
So it is obvious that the average size of microcredit under joint liability loan contract is 
far less than the average size of microcredit in individual liability loan contract. No 
VSSU client took credit from non-institutional sources between the t
th
 and (t+1)
th
 period. 
But 10 SHG members took credit from non-institutional sources within that time period 
though the size of credit is very small and varies between Rs.100 to Rs.200. They had to 
take it either because of the requirement of instantaneous loan or because of non-
availability of credit from their respective groups. Only 23 households belong to control 
group had taken credit from non-institutional sources between t
th
 and (t+1)
th
 period. Now 
to tackle the problem of selection bias in our Natural experiment we have followed the 
idea developed by Coleman (1999 and 2002) where the change of the value of outcome 
between the t
th
 and (t+1)
th
 period is considered as explained variable and membership 
dummy, size of microcredit, size of non-institutional credit, change of dependency ratio 
between the t
th
 and (t+1)
th
 period and whether the micro loan is repaid or not within 
(t+1)
th
 period as explanatory variable. The control variables or individual specific 
characteristics such as age, educational level of the respondent, skill and any other 
unobserved heterogeneity can be avoided due to applying this First Differenced method 
in our experiment. As no sample household belong to treatment group or control group 
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have received any type of skill-training between the concerned time periods, this item is 
not considered in the following regression model. 
To examine the role of micro-credit to enhance     of the sample 
households belong to treatment groups if we compare them with control group we have to 
consider the following ANCOVA models. 
………………….(1) 
………………….(2) 
The explanatory variables are described below. 
INDV =1 If the respondent is a member of VSSU and took credit from it between the 
concerned time period and = 0 otherwise 
JOINT = 1 If the respondent took credit from her (his) Self-Help Group between the 
concerned time period or = 0 otherwise. 
MCREDITj => Total size of micro-credit the j
th
 household have taken from any of the 
two Microfinance institution between t
th
 and (t+1)
th
 period
iv
. 
NCREDITj => Total size of credit the j
th
 household have taken from non-institutional 
sources between t
th
 and (t+1)
th
 period. 
DRatioj => Change of dependency ratio of the j
th
 household between t
th
 period and 
(t+1)
th
 period. Dependency ratio can be changed either due to the increase of adult 
equivalent family members or due to the change of the total earning members of the 
household. Out of 121 sample VSSU member households, the dependency ratio remains 
unchanged in 100 households and decreased in 9 households and increased in 12 
households. Similarly among 123 member households under SGSY scheme, the 
dependency ratio even in the (t+1)
th
 period remains unchanged in 96 households, 
decreased in 16 households and increased in 11 households. But in case of 90 sample 
households belong to control group, the dependency ratio remains unchanged in 85 
households, decreased in 4 households and increased in only 1 household. 
LRON = 1 If the micro credit has already been repaid within (t+1)
th
 period or = 0 if it is 
not yet repaid or for the non-borrowers. 
The regression results are shown in Table-4:  
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Table-4: Factors responsible for MINCOME and MPCE 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
MINCOME MPCE 
Constant 189.953* 41.826* 
INDV 360.819* 15.091** 
JOINT 233.530* 15.522** 
MCREDIT .0356** .00576* 
NCREDIT .00024 .0000143 
DRatio -129.055 -16.033 
LRON 98.032 8.321** 
 .324 .345 
*=> significant at 1% level and **=> significant at 5% level.  
So from the above result it is clear that microcredit has played a significant role to 
enhance monthly income and monthly per-capita consumption expenditure of the 
participants within the experimental time periods. Types of loan contract also play a 
significant role to enhance  among the participants. It is established 
that effectiveness of microcredit to increase MINCOME among the rural households 
within the concerned time period under individual liability loan contract is slightly better 
than under joint liability loan contract. But when we look at ΔMPCE, the change is 
slightly better among the participants of SGSY than VSSU. Comparatively better 
economic solvency among the participants of VSSU than the participants of SGSY and 
non-members at the baseline period is the major cause behind that. Due to this reason, the 
enhanced income is not reflected through enhanced MPCE among the participants of 
VSSU.  LRON does not make any impact on  but creates a positive impact 
on . Actually if loan is not yet totally repaid within (t+1)
th
 period then a part of the 
monthly income is spent on loan repayment and that negatively affects   but that 
is not happening here.  
In our experiment we have not found any evidence of default among the micro-borrowers 
both under individual liability as well as under joint liability loan contract. It is also 
observed from field survey that out of 57 borrowers from VSSU, 44 invested their credit 
for income generating activities mainly for expansion of their own business and the out of 
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remaining 13 borrowers, 7 took credit for medical purposes and 6 took credit for 
repairing their own houses and for daughter‟s marriage. Again out of 87 borrowers from 
SGSY scheme, 71 invested the credit for income generating activities and the remaining 
16 borrowers utilized the credit either for medical purposes or for other consumption 
purposes including daughter‟s marriage. As most of the times loan are invested in 
income-generating activities, micro credit plays an important role to enhance monthly 
income and as well as MPCE of the sample households belong to both types of treatment 
group relative to nonparticipants. 
Possible Size of Microcredit: 
Intuitively microcredit implies small size of credit. But what should be the size? Still no 
one has tried to estimate the possible size of microcredit which can maximize the welfare 
improvement of the borrowers with the help of the following two regression equations: 
 
 
The notations of the above two equations have already explained. We consider the OLS 
method with standard assumptions. The results are shown in Table-5 
Table-5: 
Name of the Variables: 
  
CONSTANT 190.554* 36.144* 
INDV 356.697* 14.970 
JOINT 249.873* 22.425 
MCREDIT .03774* .0061* 
MCREDIT
2
 -.000000372* -.000000277* 
 .258 .293 
 Rs.50,725 Rs.11010 
 
(Beyond which the 
welfare becomes 
negative) 
VSSU- Rs.114319 
SGSY- Rs.112020 
Rs.26876 
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So from Table-5 it is established that the changed values of outcome between the t
th
 and 
(t+1)
th
 period is concave in nature with respect to the size of microcredit and in both the 
situations it is increasing at a decreasing rate. It is estimated that the change of the value 
of outcome is maximum if the size of microcredit is Rs.50,725 for MINCOME, and 
Rs.11010 for MPCE respectively. The upper limit of Microcredit beyond which the 
change of the values of outcomes become negative are Rs.114319 for VSSU clients and 
Rs.112020 for SHG members if we consider the outcome as MINCOME or Rs.26876 
for any types of microfinance system when we consider the outcome as MPCE . Now if 
we give more importance on MPCE as an indicator of improvement of livelihood of the 
microfinance participants
v
 then the size of microcredit should be Rs.11010 if we want to 
get maximum increment of welfare. That is true for any type of microfinance system. But 
that should not exceed beyond Rs.26876 because higher size of microloan will create 
debt burden among the borrowers which will adversely affect his MPCE in the (t+1)
th
 
period.      
Impact on Human Capital Investment mainly on Child’s Education and Health. 
Microfinance institutions sometimes take the initiative to generate awareness on family 
health and education among its clients. This is very much observed under SGSY scheme 
(Kundu 2008) where NGO takes the main initiative. VSSU is also operating like a NGO 
and administration of VSSU claims that they always arrange campaign among its clients 
to improve their awareness on education and health. Besides that improved income as 
well as improved monthly per-capita consumption expenditure should always encourage 
the rural households to spend more on education (especially girl‟s education) and health.  
Here the expenditure on education and health includes expenditure on purchasing books 
and exercise books and on private tuition fees. The expenditure on health includes mainly 
the out of pocket medical expenses including expenses on child health. As it is expected 
that the education of a member can significantly and positively influence the importance 
of education among the children, it is treated as an explanatory variable (Edu) in the 
following equation (equation: 5). High dependency ratio automatically indicates the 
existence of more children and aged persons in that household. So it is expected that 
dependency ratio should have an influence on expenditure on health and education. 
Hence DRatiojt is here considered another explanatory variable. Now we shall investigate 
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if there is any significant change in consumption behaviour of the participants and non-
participants on education and health is observed in the end line period of our experiment. 
To test that we have to consider the following linear model: 
 
  Here EDHj(t+1) is average monthly budget share of the j
th
 household in (t+1)
th
 period on 
education and health, VSSU and SGSY are used as dummy variables and equals to 1 if 
the respondent is a member of VSSU or SHG under SGSY scheme respectively, 
otherwise zero and the notations of the other explanatory variables have already 
explained. We consider the regression equation only for the end line period to investigate 
the influence of microfinance institutions on the consumption behavior of expenditure on 
health and education among its clients. The result is shown in Table-6: 
Table-6: 
 Explanatory Variables  
Period Constant VSSU SGSY LogMINCOME DRatio Edu  
(t+1)
th
 
Period 
.027 .0051 .0047 .0111* .02432* .00076 .247 
*=> significant at 1% level. 
So it is established from Table-6 that there is no significant difference in expenditure 
behaviour on education and health of the sample households of two different types of 
microfinance programme observed in the end line period. It is just established that higher 
dependency ratio is responsible for higher expenditure on education and health because 
high dependency ratio of a household reflects the presence of school going children and 
aged members.So campaign by VSSU and local Panchayet about the importance of 
education among the children and health and change of MPCE or MINCOME between 
the concerned time period  do not make any significant improvement in expenditure share 
on human capital among the participating member households of both the types of 
microfinance system between the concerned time periods.   
Next we have to investigate whether expenditure on health and education becomes 
necessary for the sample households after joining microfinance institutions particularly in 
the end line period because it is established that within the experimental time period the 
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change of the outcome variables i.e. MPCE and MINCOME are more among the sample 
households belong to treatment groups if we compare that with control group.  
To test that we have to consider the following Engel‟s expenditure model: 
 
Here EHCAPITAL(t+1) explains the proportion of total expenditure of the sample 
households spent on education and health at (t+1)
th
 period
vi
, LnMPCE(t+1). is log of 
monthly per-capita consumption expenditure at constant price, DRatioj(t+1)
 
 is the 
dependency ratio of the j
th
 household in (t+1)
th
 period, and EDUj is the education level of 
the j
th
 respondent. Now  then expenditure on education and health is still luxury 
from the point of view of the sample household and if  then expenditure on 
education and health becomes necessary for the household after joining microfinance 
programme. The regression results are shown in Table-7 where each sample group is 
considered separately: 
Table-7: Dependent Variable EHCAPITAL(t+1) 
Independent 
Variables 
VSSU SGSY Non-Member 
LnMPCE(t+1). 226.018* 260.082* 182.163* 
DRatioj(t+1) - 4.316 -2.960 -7.971 
EDUj 16.196 4.836* 10.636* 
Constant -1501.858 -1876.432 -1313.665 
 .337 .549 .353 
So it is clear that even after joining microfinance programme, at the end line period both 
types of rural participants still consider expenditure on health and education is luxury. It 
is also established that an increase in MPCE at 1% on average leads to about 2.26 rupees 
increase in the expenditure on health and education of the VSSU clients. Similarly the 
increase is Rs.2.60 for SHG members under SGSY scheme and Rs.1.82 for non-
members. So the change of expenditure on health and education between t
th
 and (t+1)
th
 
period is maximum among the SHG members under SGSY scheme if we compare them 
with VSSU members or non-members. Actually the SHG member households were 
almost at the bottom of an economic pyramid in the base line period. But as the 
information about health, education and nutrition are channeled in the member household 
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through the main woman member, some parts of enhanced income is utilized as expenses 
of different human development factors of the household. But the change was not so high 
for the member households of VSSU where the member is not the female but male.    
Effects on Women’s Empowerment:  
Few studies in recent past have attempted to establish the relationship between credit 
program participation and some notion of Women‟s empowerment. Hashemi, Schuler 
and Railey (1996) found that membership in Grameen bank and BRAC has a significant 
positive effect on Empowerment of the participants. Holvoet (2005) carried out one of the 
most carefully designed studies of the impact on decision making in the context of Tamil 
Nadu. She found that channeling loan through women‟s group rather than to individual 
women substantially increased the likelihood of female decision making and bargaining 
relative to male decision making. However Rahman (2001) provided quantitative and 
qualitative evidence to this effect. He reported that out of 120 women borrowers with 
Grameen bank in one village 18% reported a decrease in violence while 70% reported 
increase of violence within the households as a result of their involvement with the bank. 
Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2006) established that participation in microcredit 
program enhances the index of empowerment which leads to women taking a greater role 
in household decision making, having greater access to financial and economic resources, 
greater social network, and greater bargaining power with their husband and greater 
freedom of mobility. But this paper is based on the members of Grammen bank and 
BRAC where most of the members are female and their microfinance program was 
operating on the basis of joint liability loan contract. Here we consider two different 
types of microfinance system simultaneously where not all the participants are female. It 
has already been told that most of the participants of VSSU are male and of SHGs under 
SGSY scheme are female. So in this situation we have to investigate whether intra-
household decision making powers of the women have improved in their own house after 
she herself or any other male member of the household she belongs (mainly the husband) 
had joined any type of microfinance programme. We also try to investigate whether any 
significant difference is observed among the participants of VSSU and SGSY scheme. To 
test that we have to depend on the following Analysis of Variance model: 
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Here implies change of Women‟s Empowerment Index of the jth household 
between t
th
 period and (t+1)
th
 period.  
The explanatory variables are explained as follows: 
VSSU = 1 if the sample household is a member of VSSU within the concerned time 
period and = 0 otherwise. 
SGSY = 1 if the sample household is a member of Self-Help Group under SGSY scheme 
and = 0 otherwise. 
SEX is here treated as Dummy variable and = 1 if the respondent is female or = 0 if the 
respondent is male.   
So FVSSU = 1 if the female member of the household had joined VSSU in the t
th
 period 
and = 0 if the male member of the sample household had joined VSSU in the t
th
 period. 
FSGSY = 1 if the female member of the household has joined SGSY scheme in the t
th
  
period and = 0 if the male member of the sample household has joined SGSY scheme in 
the t
th
 period.  
The regression result shows the following result: 
 =   
Here  and * => significant at 1% level. 
The above regression shows average change of Empowerment Index of the female 
member of a household when she herself have joined VSSU is 1.864 and if the male 
member of the household joined VSSU then that average change of his wife is 1.021. 
Similarly average change of Empowerment Index of the main female member of a 
household when she herself joined SGSY scheme is 2.474 but if the male member of the 
sample household joined SGSY scheme then that change of his wife becomes 1.231. But 
among the non-participants that average change is only .256. 
So intra household decision making power has definitely improved after a rural 
household joined microfinance system but the improvement is maximum if the female 
member of the household herself joins microfinance system under SGSY scheme through 
forming Self-Help Group.  
Participation in a microfinance programme is hypothesized to increase empowerment in 
at least two ways: by placing more financial resources in women‟s hand and by 
increasing women‟s bargaining power within the household because of increased 
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financial contribution and by building solidarity and self-esteem through group activity 
with other women. It is already established that most of the households who have joined 
SGSY scheme have come from less affluent family background where male members of 
the family are the principal earning members. So empowerment of the female members 
of those families is not so high in the t
th
 time period. Actually a female member of the 
household after joining SHG becomes much more aware about her rights. Apart from that 
few have improved their financial contribution within their family either through 
becoming an earning member or through improving her income after taking credit from 
her respective group. This automatically help them to improve their intra-household 
decision making power within the family and so the value of Women‟s Empowerment 
Index of those women have improved.    
Conclusions: 
At the base line period the prospective members of SHG under SGSY scheme are 
comparatively less affluent than the prospective members of VSSU. Most of the times the 
VSSU members took credit for income generating activities mainly to expand their 
existing business where microcredit was used as working capital and the size of credit are 
also quite large if we compare that with the borrowers under SGSY scheme whose 
members took credit both for income generating as well as non income generating 
activities. The increment of MINCOME after utilizing microcredit (whose estimated 
maximum value should be Rs.11000) is more for the borrower member households of 
VSSU if we compare that with the member households under SGSY Scheme which itself 
much higher than the non-institutional borrower member households belong to control 
group but in terms of MPCE we observe the change of MPCE is much better among the 
SHG members than VSSU members. Actually the member households of VSSU did not 
spend their major portion of their enhanced income for consumption purposes but the 
members of SGSY have saved little and have spent the major portion of their enhanced 
income for consumption purposes. It is also observed that the increase of income in both 
the situations is not reflected in the increase of expenditure on human capital. Still both 
the participant households consider expenditure on health and education is luxury. The 
intra-household decision making power of the rural woman has been improved much 
better among the female participants of under SGSY scheme of the government if we 
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compare them with the women of the member households of VSSU and of households 
belong to control group. So from this Natural experiment we can conclude that joint 
liability credit contract is comparatively more effective than individual liability 
microcredit contract for socio-economic up gradation of the poor rural households where 
the members of the SHG should be the main female member of the household.   
Appendix-1 
Calculation of Women‟s Empowerment Index: (Asked either the member or wife 
(mother) of the member 
Name of the Variable Points 
1. Decision about utilization of Micro-
credit 
Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
2. Decision on purchase of daily food 
items 
Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
3. Decision on purchase of live stock Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
4. Decision on purchase of utensils 
and other household items 
Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
5. Decision on child education, child 
vaccination and other health related 
matters 
Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
6. Does she earn regularly and 
contribute in her family? 
Yes:- 2, No:-0 
7. Can she participate in different 
gram sabhas according to her will? 
Yes: -1, No:-0 
8. Can she spend for consumable 
goods (cosmetics) according to her 
will? 
Yes: -1, No:-0 
9. Can she go outside without taking 
permission from her husband or 
elder son? 
Yes: -1, No:-0 
10. Can she cast her vote according to 
her will? 
Yes: -2, No:-0 
11. Can she protect herself against 
domestic violence? 
Yes: -1, No:-0 
12. Decision on Family Planning  Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
 
   Maximum point is 20 and more point indicates more Empowerment of Woman or more 
intra-household decision making power of the main woman of the sample household.     
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i
 So the rate of interest charged against credit in both types of microfinance system are more or less same. 
ii
 The survey was conducted between August to December in 2008. This time period was considered in 
order to minimize the recall period of each respondent. 
iii
 Calculated by the author. 
iv
 Here all the borrowers took credit only once between the two time periods. 
v
 Because in India, poverty is measured through Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure. 
vi
 The calculation is done on monthly basis. 
